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FISCAL DECENTRALISATION
AS A MECHANISM TO
MODERNISE THE STATE:
TRUTHS AND MYTHS
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I
t has been argued that generally Fiscal
Decentralisation (FD) enhances public sector
efficiency and thereby constitutes a powerful mech-
anism to modernise the State. The extent to which
such a view is supported by the empirical evidence
is, however, a contestable issue. In the same way as
the theoretical debate on the subject matter has
been intense, the empirical evidence has made sig-
nificant progresses in providing a more accurate
diagnostic about the effects of FD. This paper pre-
sents a comprehensive review of this controversy,
trying to distinguish between the truths and the
myths concerning the potential benefits of FD.
Three questions are still open on the debate we are
dealing with. One is the extent to which every gov-
ernment’s function has to be decentralised. Whilst
some evidence suggests that education and health
are attractive areas to look upon, this is far from
being clear for most other functions. Secondly,
although FD appears to be good in some cases, it
seems to be equally relevant to discuss whether
this is valid for all countries, regardless of their
institutional development and other idiosyncratic
characteristics. Finally, even if we acknowledge
that some countries and specific policies are the
optimum candidates to be decentralised, there is
still the need to specify the way in which this FD
will take place. Although more FD involves some
kind of devolution of public resources in favor of
lower tiers of government, this may adopt a wide
range of forms. In order to shed light on these
questions, we first briefly describe the most impor-
tant theoretical arguments both in favor as well as
against FD. Secondly, the empirical evidence on
these hypotheses is presented.
The theory on Fiscal Decentralisation
A common starting point on the subject under
analysis is the so-called Decentralisation Theorem
developed by Oates (1972). It asserts that “…the
level of welfare will always be at least as high (and
typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of con-
sumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if
any single uniform level of consumption is main-
tained across all jurisdictions” (Oates 1972, 54).
Since any hypothesis on the subject entails a par-
ticular set of assumptions about the real function-
ing of independent jurisdictions, many theories can
be built upon the theorem.They can be sorted into
those that identify the likely positive effects of FD
and those that emphasise its weaknesses. In this
regard, Oates’s theorem is a useful benchmark to
take as a starting point. The theorem explicitly
assumes no costs of FD and the absence of inter-
jurisdictional externalities.
Pro-decentralisation hypotheses belong to three
basic categories. The first one is what may be
labeled the “information argument”,which empha-
sises the gains derived from the fact that decen-
tralisation gets public officers and politicians clos-
er to the people they are supposed to serve. Since
information on real local needs will be more easily
available, public policies will be more efficiently
designed. The second hypothesis hinges upon the
analogy between decentralisation and the func-
tioning of a competitive market. This is based on
the assumption that fiscally decentralised jurisdic-
tions will interact with each other in a similar way
as firms compete in the market place. Account-
ability is being enforced by the “voting with the
feet”mechanism,whereby residents penalize badly
performing local governments by exerting their
right to exit. Thirdly, the public choice school has
popularised what might be called the Leviathan
hypothesis, whereby decentralisation prevents tax-
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and in so doing it protects citizens from the dan-
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However trendy, FD has numerous detractors. A
first strand of criticism stresses the weaknesses of
the view that competitive private firms may be
assimilated to the case of independent jurisdictions
playing in the political market. In the first place,
there is the old and highly theoretical issue as to
whether a competitive equilibrium between juris-
dictions does indeed exist. Closely linked to this
point is the extent to which individuals make their
decisions about migration on the basis of the cur-
rent performance of the particular tier of govern-
ment they belong to. It may be hypothesised that
some kind of “citizen’s surplus” exists, which
makes citizens value cultural affinities, ties of
friendship, family and local economic connections
beyond the performance of the jurisdiction where
they live.
Secondly, a key issue to the caveats on FD is the
assumption about externalities. Their existence
raises numerous problems about the functioning of
competitive jurisdictions making independent
decisions. The case for externalities can easily be
extended to the issue of tax competition and its
potential effects on the efficient funding of local
public goods. In so far as subnational governments
are faced with a trade-off between higher tax rates
and smaller tax bases, more FD leads to significant
distortions in local tax structures. Similarly, decen-
tralisation of some national public policies might
result in severe coordination costs and underprovi-
sion of local public goods.The potential for this to
jeopardize fiscal balance and macroeconomic sta-
bility has been widely discussed.
A third type of criticism can be put under the label
of “technological” arguments.They hinge upon the
characteristics of the particular technologies that
are needed for the efficient provision of public
goods. As long as decentralisation results in the
loss of economies of scale, local budgets will rise
excessively relative to what might be expected
under a more centralised arrangement. On the one
hand, it might be argued that developing countries
need a significant degree of centralisation to build
up its basic infrastructure. On the other, if econo-
mies of scale are a factor worth considering in the
provision of some public goods, it follows that
decentralisation may appear as a very expensive
“good” which developing countries can hardly
afford.
Fourthly, efficient local public provision can also
be negatively affected by the shortage of some
kind of input. This is likely to be the case when it
comes to lower tiers of government’s officers and
their capacity to provide highly skilled quality pub-
lic management. Moreover, access to up-to-date
and comprehensive information will be initially
available at the highest administrative level.
Alongside the public management quality is the
concern for corruption. Excess closeness of local
officers from private local interests is a potentially
dangerous fact in poor countries.
What we know about the effects of Fiscal
Decentralisation
The first conclusion we can draw from the
hypotheses above is that FD might improve the
allocation of resources and thereby enhance
growth.Evidence on this is,however,far from clear
(Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2003). The table
below shows that neither cross-country estimations
nor country-specific studies provide systematic evi-
dence on the effect of FD on growth. Results seem
to be sensitive to the data set being used in the esti-
mations (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002), the proxy for
decentralisation, the set of control variables in the
regressions and the specific country being analysed
(Zhang and Zou 1997, 1998; Lin and Lui 2000). A
recent study on the case of Russia suggests that
even the specific form of subnational governments’
revenues appears to be relevant in the likelihood
of FD having an effect on growth (Desai,
Freinkman and Goldberg 2003).
If we accept that no strong evidence exists which
relates FD with growth, it is still feasible that the
quality of growth may indeed be effected. As long
as quality of life involves good governance, it fol-
lows that a comprehensive account of indicators on
government’s performance should be positively
related to FD. Existing evidence from the table
below shows that generally FD appears to enhance
good governance. In a well-quoted paper, Huther
and Shaha (1998) found a significant and strong
correlation between FD and a composite index of
“good governance”.Further support to this finding
is given by De Mello and Barenstein (2001). Their
results suggest that governance is only improved
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when FD is very high and sub national govern-
ments’ funding comes from non-tax revenues.
Interestingly, while De Mello and Barenstein con-
clude that only a high degree of FD may lead to a
significant effect on governance, further evidence
given by Braun and Grote (2000) shows that this
effect is decreasing on the level of FD. Closely
related with the concept of good government is the
potential relationship between decentralisation
and corruption.The evidence available allows us to
say that, while FD seems to reduce corruption
when this is measured as the share of subnational
governments on the general government’s expen-
ditures or revenues (Fisman and Gatti 2002; De
Mello 2000a, Huther and Shah 1998), this result is
reversed when the political definition of decentral-
isation is adopted (Treisman 2000a).
A similar research line has focused on more specif-
ic functional areas of government. Evidence show-
ing that social capital might be positively affected
by FD is provided by De Mello (2000a). By using
cross country data, Letelier (2001) and Lindaman
and Thurmaier (2002) support the finding that FD
enhances the role of government on education and
health. Country specific results confirms this in the
case of Chile (Vega 2002) and Argentina (Habibi
et al. 2003).A closer look at the health issue raises
new questions on the type of countries in which
this conclusion is applicable. Whereas immunisa-
tion appears to respond positively to FD in low
income countries, the opposite occurs in middle
income countries (Khaleghian 2003). In this re-
gard, the strength on political institutions appears
to be a precondition for decentralisation to have a
significant impact on the infant mortality rate
(Robalino,Picazo and Voetberg 2001).Evidence of
the effect of decentralisation on the level and qual-
ity of the current infrastructure is still scant and
subject to further review. Whilst Faguet (2001)
shows that decentralising policies implemented in
Bolivia which started in 1994 had a major impact
on the allocation of public investment in favor of
those areas more in need, Humplick and Estache
(1995) provide cross country evidence showing
that decentralisation may result in a higher vari-
ance in performance across regions.
The argument that FD improves various aspects of
basic human needs leads to the conclusion that
even if FD dos not affect growth directly, it does so
indirectly through some of the factors commonly
recognized in the literature as being responsible
for growth. As this appears to be relevant in edu-
cation and health, it might also be the case for
other variables.One of them is the potential for fis-
cal imbalance stemming from FD. Fornasari,Webb
and Zou (1999) perform long- and short-run esti-
mates of the effects of FD on government expen-
ditures and fiscal deficit. In the steady-state long-
run estimates, their results show that no significant
effects of FD can be detected.When it comes to the
short run, FD clearly increases the central govern-
ment’s deficit. The main lesson to be learnt is that
general fiscal imbalance is more likely to arise
when a process of FD is in progress. Similarly, the
lack of clear cut rules that limit the support of the
central government to heavily indebted subnation-
al governments seems to be a key factor in under-
standing why FD will probably worsen fiscal bal-
ance in developing countries. In support of this, De
Mello (1999, 2000b) shows that FD is more likely
to deteriorate fiscal balance in non-OEDC coun-
tries. Nevertheless, when using a more accurate
measurement of FD, Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) find
that FD is equally conducive to fiscal imbalance in
OECD countries. As far as inflation is concerned,
Treisman (2000b) finds no clear relation between
FD and the level of inflation. However, Treisman
also finds that decentralisation tends to perpetuate
the existing pattern of monetary policy regardless
of the current level of inflation.While high income
federations exhibit more stable inflation patterns
over time,low-income federations that started with
higher degrees of inflation tend to worsen the ini-
tial situation very rapidly.
What we do not know about Fiscal
Decentralisation
There are at least three avenues through which
future research on the effects of FD might be
enriched.The first one refers to testing the benefits of
FD by using a more accurate cross-country measure-
ment of it.The fact that different results are obtained
when two alternative data set are used in order to
estimate similar or even identical models, confirms
that a lot is still to be done in order to produce better
quality data on FD.In particular,it would be of much
help to have better cross-country measurements of
tax autonomy and the share of block grants as
opposed to categorical grants being given to subna-
tional governments. Whilst some measurements of
this kind do exist for the OECD countries (Ebel and
Yilmaz 2002), similar information is still far frombeing available as far as developing countries are
concerned. This is not only relevant from the view-
point of making more robust predictions on the
impact of FD, but it would also shed light on the par-
ticular form of FD that enhances the provision of
public services. Since fiscal autonomy involves vary-
ing degrees of maneuvers on taxes, grants, borrowing
and user charges, it certainly matters what the opti-
mal share and the specific design of these sources is.
Regardless of the data quality problem, more
research is clearly needed at the country level.
Although the empirical literature is abundant in
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Empirical evidence on the effects of Fiscal Decentralisation
Growth
• Woller and Phillips (1998) No strong relationship is found. (*)
• Davoodi and Zou (1998) Developing countries appear to respond negatively, albeit not significantly, to
FD  (*).
• Zhang and Zou (1997) Evidence of a significant effect of FD on growth for India.
• Zhang and Zou (1998) A negative relationship is found for China.
• Lin and Liu (2000) A positive relationship is found for China.
• Xie, , Zou, and Davoodi (1999) No evidence of systematic effects of FD on growth for the USA.
• Ebel and Yilmaz. (2002) Evidence is not clear for a sample of OECD countries. Results are very
sensitive to the measurement of FD  (*).
• Desai, Freinkman and Goldberg (2003)
Generally, FD enhances growth in the Russian Federation. However, the effect
of FD is negative on regions in which local revenues mostly derive from
sources other than taxes. This is the case of natural resources and transfers
from the federal government.
Life Quality
• Humplick and Estache (1995)
Wea k  evid ence  in  favo r  of  the  hyp  othesis that FD strength ens  in frastr ucture .
Dec entralizatio n  resu lts  in   highe r  variance  in  perf ormanc e  acro ss  jur isdictions  ( *).
• De Mello (2000a) FD affects social capital positively (*).
• Braun and Grote (2000) FD Improves the human Development Index. It does it at a decreasing rate (*).
• Faguet (2001) Evidence for Bolivia shows that decentralizing policies started in 1994
produced major changes on 13 different areas of public interest.
• Letelier (2001) A positive and strong relationship is found between FD and government s
performance on education and health (*).
• Robalino, Picazo and Voetberg (2001) FD reduces infant mortality rate in low-income countries with strong political
institutions.
• Lindaman and Thurmaier (2002) A positive and strong relationship is found between FD and government s
performance on education and health (*).
• Vegas (2002) Decentralized publicly funded schools perform better than non-decentralized
ones in Chile.
• Habibi et al. (2003) It shows that for the case of Argentina, the process of FD affected positively
and significantly the outputs of health and education.
• Khaleghian (2003) FD improves immunization in low-income countries, but it worsens it in
middle income countries.
Governance
• Huther and Shaha (1998) Evidence of a positive relationship between FD and a composite index of
good governance  (*).
• De Mello and Barenstein (2001) FD affects governance positively. Non-tax revenues are the best way to fund
sub national governments.
Corruption
• Huther and Shah (1998) FD reduces corruption (*).
• Treisman (2000b) Five alternative definitions of decentralization show that corruption is higher
in federal countries. (*)
• De Mello (2000a) FD reduces corruption (*).
• Fisman and  Gatti (2002). FD reduces corruption (*).
Fiscal Imbalance
• Fornasari, Webb and Zou (1999) No significant effect is detected in the long run. In the short run FD clearly
increases the Central Government deficit (*).
• De Mello (1999) FD  may lead to  coordination failures  between levels of government.
Evidence confirms this for developing countries (*).
• De Mello (2000b) Tax autonomy exerts a negative effect on subnational and central government
balances. This is more likely to occur in developing countries with fragile
institutional arrangements.
• Treisman, D. (2000a) No clear relationship between decentralization and the level of inflation is
found. However, political decentralization reduces the variability of inflation
over time.
• Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) Evidence is not clear for a sample of OECD countries. Results are very
sensitive to the measurement of FD (*).
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case country studies, these are very seldom based
on rigorous statistical analysis. For example, a pub-
lic policy target being commonly considered but
largely disregarded in the empirical literature, is
the potential effect of FD on innovation. Various
countries grant subnational governments and/or
publicly supported service producing units in order
to promote innovation in the areas of education,
health, public investment and the like. Although
the well-known review by Oates (1999) reports two
studies on the subject matter,they both refer to the
United States, use very limited information and
their results are rather inconclusive.
Finally, there is still the question as to whether FD
is indeed an exogenous variable at the disposal of
the policy maker. An obvious question is why –
decentralisation being so clearly beneficial to
some areas of public interest – the national medi-
an voter is not always willing to undertake radical
reforms in this respect (Panizza 1999; Letelier
2003). One possible answer is that even if the
median voter is well informed about the effects
reported above, he will face numerous constraints
to achieve the optimum. Elections in developing
countries are very often non-democratic and sub-
ject to various imperfections. Additionally, FD is
not a cost-free policy. On the one hand, economies
of scale and extra coordination costs might be
important in the provision of some public goods.
On the other, typically low income countries with
weak institutions might not be willing to put their
precarious fiscal stability at jeopardy by conceding
subnational governments more leeway to decide
on taxes,expenditures and borrowing.If we accept
that any form of decentralisation is at least in part
being explained by development, it follows that
policy recommendations should be qualified in
terms of the country at stake and the public func-
tion being decentralised.
Conclusions
This paper offers a typology of the main theoreti-
cal arguments in favor and against FD, and it pro-
vides a comprehensive review on the empirical lit-
erature about its likely effects. On the theoretical
front, three basic arguments in support of decen-
tralisation are identified. They are the informa-
tion argument, the analogy between decentralisa-
tion and the functioning of a competitive market,
and the Leviathan argument.The core of the aca-
demic criticism on FD can be summarised by five
basic points. Firstly, there is the potential of exter-
nalities between jurisdictions, which leads to dif-
ferences between the national social optimum and
the targets being achieved by decentralised juris-
dictions as a group. Secondly, the set of assump-
tions on which the well-known Tibout model is
built has been subject to severe critiques.Thirdly,
it has been argued that local government’s offi-
cers and politicians are not as capable of obtain-
ing and close to up-to-date relevant information
as their central government counterparts. Finally,
the potential for corruption stems from the
extreme proximity of local officers to private local
interests.
Whilst the empirical literature is not conclusive
about the potential effects on growth,it does show
that the quality of growth may be significantly
improved by FD. In particular, there exists sub-
stantial evidence that decentralisation improves
the quality of public education, health and other
indicators of good governance. Concerning the
impact of FD on fiscal balance, results are very
sensitive to the definition of decentralisation
being used, the set of control variables in the
regressions, the extension of time over which this
impact is being measured, and more importantly,
the type of countries being considered in the sam-
ple. Some of this evidence, and specially that on
the effects of inflation,shows that FD is more like-
ly to worsen the initial situation in developing
countries, while it tends to perpetuate the current
performance over time. The strength of institu-
tions appears to be a fundamental condition for
FD to be beneficiary.
A lot more work is still to be done in order to cap-
ture normative aspects on the measurement of FD.
Country case studies based on robust statistical
techniques is certainly the most promising future
research avenue for empirical studies on this field.
Finally and most importantly, the empirical litera-
ture is generally based on the assumption of decen-
tralisation as an exogenous variable. While this
might be a sound assumption for some specific
decentralising policies in specific countries, it does
not seem to be the case for the aggregate trend of
FD in large samples of countries. The degree to
which public officers and politicians are indeed
able to promote decentralisation hinges upon the
dubious view that this is a factor explaining devel-
opment rather than a consequence of it.References
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